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NOTPETYA, NOT WARFARE: RETHINKING THE 
INSURANCE WAR EXCLUSION IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INTERNATIONAL CYBERATTACKS 
Katherine S. Wan*  
Abstract: When an insurer wants to avoid coverage of a specific type of loss, it must 
explicitly exclude the loss in its policy. The war exclusion is a typical exclusion found in 
insurance policies that excuses insurers from covering losses caused by war or warlike actions. 
Courts interpreting the exclusion have traditionally held that war must consist of hostilities 
between sovereign nations. Despite the rise of state-sponsored cyberattacks, the United States 
has been hesitant to officially declare war in response. Even still, insurers argue that their war 
exclusions should apply to these new cyber losses. Courts are now tasked with reanalyzing the 
war exclusion in the context of the rise of cyberwarfare. This Comment examines the history 
of the war exclusion, the policy reasons behind burden allocation, and where cyberattacks fall 
on the spectrum between war and terrorism. Insurers should not be able to use the war 
exclusion to escape liability for state-sponsored cyberattacks. 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 27, 2017, Mondel z In erna ional, one of he orld s larges  
snack companies, had its multinational business interrupted by the 
NotPetya cyberattacks.1 These attacks resulted in stolen user credentials 
and the physical loss of thousands of computers and servers.2 Mondel z 
estimated that it lost over $100 million from hardware and business 
interruption as a result of the cyberattacks.3 Mondel z was one of many 
corporations to suffer losses from this global incident.4 
Almost eight months after the attack, the United States government 
announced its conclusion that the Russian military was responsible for the 
NotPetya attacks.5 Mondel z submitted a claim under its commercial 
                                                     
* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2021. I would like to thank the 
attorneys at Gordon Tilden Thomas & Cordell, especially Frank Cordell and Susannah Carr, for their 
insight and expertise. I would also like to thank my colleagues at Washington Law Review for helping 
me polish this Comment for publication. 
1. Adam Satariano & Nicole Perlroth, Big Companies Thought Insurance Covered a Cyberattack. 
They May Be Wrong., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/ 
technology/cyberinsurance-notpetya-attack.html [https://perma.cc/2CBH-P2ND]. 
2. Complaint at 2 3, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018L011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 2018), 2018 WL 4941760.  
3. Id. at 3. 
4. See Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.  
5. Press Briefing, The White House, Statement from the Press Sec y (Feb. 15, 2018) [hereinafter 
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property insurance policy, which covered physical loss or damage to 
electronic data.6 Mondel z s ins rer, Z rich, denied he claim nder he 
polic s ar or arlike ac s e cl sion.7 On October 10, 2018, Mondel z 
filed a lawsuit against Zurich in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Illinois.8 The case is currently pending.9 
The policy at issue in the Mondel z lawsuit is an all risk property 
insurance policy.10 An all risk property insurance policy provides first 
party coverage for losses o he ins red s proper  ca sed b  all perils 
not specifically excluded  b  he polic  lang age.11 In general, an insurer 
may include exclusions or limitations in its policy with the insured as part 
of its freedom to contract.12 However, under the doctrine of contra 
proferentem, the terms of an exclusion are generally construed strictly 
against the insurer.13 This doctrine resolves all ambiguities in favor of the 
insured because of the presumed imbalance of bargaining power between 
the parties.14 If the risk is deemed to be generally included within the terms 
of the policy, courts will find coverage unless the insurer can show that 
the parties clearly intended to exclude the loss.15 
The war and warlike actions exclusion at issue in Mondel z s s i  
against Zurich is a common exclusion in property policies, which 
typically states that the insurer is not liable for losses caused by war or 
                                                     
Statement from the Press Secretary], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-
press-secretary-25/ [https://perma.cc/7YM2-G4S2].  
6. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 3. 
7. See id. at 4. 
8. See id. at 1. 
9. See Docket, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018-L-011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Oct. 
10, 2018).  
10. Complaint, supra note 2, at 1. 
11. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 10A COUCH ON INS. § 148:4 (3d ed. 2019). The other type of insurance 
that is commonly issued is liability insurance. See Elisa Alcabes et al., A Concise Guide to Insurance 
Litigation in USA, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 18, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/WD3A-ULHH]. In the commercial context, the standard liability insurance would 
be a commercial general liability policy. Id. Liability policies protect the insured from liability when 
third parties are injured and sue the insured. Id. This Comment is not concerned with liability policies 
and will focus on the interpretation of all risk property insurance policies.  
12. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 2 COUCH ON INS. § 22:31 (3d ed. 2019). 
13. See Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019) 
( Under he doc rine of con ra proferen em, an  ambig i  in an e cl sion is generall  cons r ed 
agains  he ins rer and in fa or of he ins red. ).  
14. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1000 (2d Cir. 1974) 
( [I]  is no  s fficien  for he all risk ins rers  case for hem o offer a reasonable in erpre a ion nder 
which the loss is excluded; they must demonstrate that an interpretation favoring them is the only 
reasonable reading of a  leas  one of he rele an  erms of e cl sion. ). 
15. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 12, § 22:31. 
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warlike actions.16 This exclusion is not difficult to apply during times of 
declared war.17 However, the application becomes more complicated 
when countries, such as the United States, blame foreign nations for 
attacks but do not formally declare war.18 For example, the United States 
government blamed North Korea for hacking Sony in 2014 and causing 
an es ima ed $100 million in damage, b  labeled he a ack c ber-
andalism,  no  ar.19 
Additionally, the rise of terrorism in the twentieth century has made it 
more difficult to differentiate acts of war from acts of terrorism.20 War 
must consist of hostilities between sovereign nations.21 Under the Hague 
Convention, a soldier must be under the command of a responsible party, 
carry arms openly, wear distinctive insignia, and operate lawfully in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war to be considered an 
operative of war.22 In contrast, Black  La  Dic iona  defines terrorism 
as [ ]he se or hrea  of iolence o in imida e or ca se panic, esp[eciall ] 
as a means of achie ing a poli ical end. 23 The entry notes various types 
of terrorism some committed by state-actors, some committed by 
unaffiliated individuals, and some committed by political organizations 
unattached to any specific country.24 While courts have applied the war 
exclusion to losses caused by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
(hereinafter 9/11 attacks), they have refused to expand the coverage to 
                                                     
16. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1 ( Mos  proper  ins rance policies pro ide 
coverage on an all-risk basis. However, all-risk policies do not cover all losses, but contain at least 
four exclusions that may be relevant to war or war-related losses. The first exclusion, the war 
e cl sion, foc ses on he na re of he ac  and he ac ors. ); see also Pan Am. World Airways, 505 
F.2d a  994 (e cerp ing he e cl sion lang age from Pan Am s polic  i h Ae na). 
17. See Vanderbil  . Tra elers  Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 56 (S p. C . 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986 
(App. Div. 1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514 (1923); In l Dair  Eng g Co. of Asia, Inc. . Am. Home 
Assurance Co., 352 F. Supp. 827 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff d, 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973). 
18. See Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5 (blaming Russia for NotPetya attacks but 
not declaring war). 
19. See Matthew Foy & Jonathan Schwartz, Son  In e ie  Q agmi e: A Wa e hed Momen  fo  
Cyberinsurance, IN-HOUSE DEF. Q., Spring 2015, at 73, 77. 
20. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
21. See Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 990.  
22. See Hague Convention (II) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the 
Convention, July 29, 1899, § 1, ch. 1, art. 1 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. The Hague Convention 
governs and defines laws of war and war crimes in international law. See Hague Convention, ENCYC. 
BRITANNICA (June 8, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/event/Hague-Conventions 
[https://perma.cc/WJ2L-FLEF].  
23. Terrorism, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
24. Id.  
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other acts of terror.25 
Terrorist activities have evolved alongside modern warfare, 
incorporating and utilizing new technologies such as the internet and 
leading to the rise of cyberattacks.26 A cyberattack is defined by the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary as an a emp  o gain illegal access o a 
computer or computer system for the purpose of causing damage or 
harm. 27 In 2017, former Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
es ima ed ha  he mone ar  cos s of global ann al c bercrime will 
do ble from $3 rillion in 2015 o $6 rillion in 2021. 28 FBI Director 
Chris opher Wra  arned Congress ha  he freq enc  and impac  of 
cyber-a acks on o r Na ion s pri a e sec or and Go ernmen  ne orks 
have increased dramatically in the past decade and are expected to 
con in e o gro . 29 With the increase in cyberattacks, corporate victims 
have tried to recoup their losses through their insurers.30 Courts have 
generally struggled to interpret archaic policies in light of the modern 
tools of attack, in part because cyberattacks can be perpetrated by a variety 
of parties.31 
This Comment explores the application of the war exclusion clause in 
all risk property insurance policies to deny liability for losses caused by 
foreign cyberattacks. Part I discusses the traditional use of the war 
exclusion clause in all risk property policies, beginning with the common 
                                                     
25. Compare In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 514 (applying war exclusion to insurance 
claim arising from 9/11 attacks), with Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1015 (declining to 
apply war exclusion for loss caused by Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) airplane 
hijacking).  
26. See generally Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att y Gen., Remarks at the 2017 North American 
International Cyber Summit (Oct. 30, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/deputy-attorney-
general-rosenstein-delivers-remarks-2017-north-american-international [https://perma.cc/PV78 
2LMU]; World-Wide Threats: Keeping America Secure in the New Age of Terror: Hearing Before 
the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 115th Cong. 29 (2017) [hereinafter World-Wide Threats] (statement 
of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation). 
27. Cyberattack, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ cyberattack 
[https://perma.cc/Z8PT-45S2]. 
28. Rosenstein, supra note 26. 
29. World-Wide Threats, supra note 26 (statement of Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of 
Investigation). 
30. See generally Thomas D. Hunt, The In e ne  of B ilding : In ance of C be  Ri k  fo  
Commercial Real Estate, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 397, 405 (2019) (noting that insurers collected $3.25 
billion in cyber insurance premiums from businesses in 2016 and expect to quadruple revenue by 
2025). 
31. See Foy & Schwartz, supra note 19; Rosenstein, supra note 26. ( Toda , he a acks are 
concerted efforts by sophisticated individuals, criminal enterprises, or nation-states that can target a 
range of home users, businesses, networks, or critical infrastructure with laser-like precision to cause 
idespread damage. ).  
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la  applica ion in he Uni ed Kingdom hro gh he Second Circ i s 
decisions in the 1980s.32 Part II anal es he Nin h Circ i s applica ion 
of the war exclusion in 2019 and its invocation of the political question 
doctrine.33 Part II then discusses the history of the political question 
doc rine and he co r s  pas  prac ice of keeping he de ermina ion of ar 
a judicial question.34 Part III explores the history of cyberattacks and 
highlights two recent ransomware attacks that have affected global 
politics and insurance litigation the WannaCry and NotPetya 
cyberattacks. Part IV examines terrorism and cyber insurance policies and 
explains why they are not used by corporate insureds to recover from 
state-sponsored cyberattacks. Finally, Part V asserts that insurers should 
not be able to escape liability for cyberattacks using the traditional war 
exclusion. For the purposes of applying the war exclusion, determining 
sovereignty should be a judicial question rather than a political question. 
Further, under the circumstances such as the NotPetya attacks, courts 
should not permit insurers to use the war exclusion to escape their 
contractual obligations to cover losses. 
I. THE TRADITIONAL USE OF THE WAR EXCLUSION 
CLAUSE IN ALL RISK PROPERTY POLICIES ENCOURAGES 
A NARROW APPLICATION 
The war exclusion is a common exclusion found in commercial all risk 
property insurance policies.35 While the exclusion is relatively easy to 
apply in periods of declared war, it becomes more problematic when the 
combatants do not clearly belong to a sovereign nation. Part I begins by 
illustrating the industry rationale for writing the war exclusion and the 
traditional application of the exclusion in the late nineteenth century. The 
second section of Part I analyzes Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.36 and he case s more con emporar  
application of the war exclusion in the face of the rise of terrorism in the 
1970s. Finally, the last section of Part I discusses the development of the 
idea of sovereignty and its relationship with terrorism and civil unrest 
                                                     
32. See Britain S.S. Co. v. The King [1919] 1 K.B. 575; Holiday Inns Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 
F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).  
33. See Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).  
34. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974); 
Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. 1460. 
35. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1. 
36. 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974). 
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through the Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co.37 case. 
A. The Application of the War Exclusion and Traditional Warfare 
Insurance companies developed the war exclusion to eliminate the 
ins rer s liabili  for losses ha  occurred during war because i  [ as] 
impossible o e al a e he po en ial ins red risks. 38 In the insurance 
ind s r , ar  has a er  specific meaning.39 Bo h English and 
American cases dealing i h he ins rance meaning of ar  ha e defined 
it in accordance with the ancient international law definition: war refers 
to and includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute 
go ernmen s a  leas  de fac o in charac er. 40 In other words, war  in the 
insurance context is limited to hostilities between de jure or de facto 
sovereign entities.41 Because of the unpredictable and potentially 
catastrophic nature of war, the insurance industry decided that it was 
better to exclude war losses instead of attempting to calculate premiums 
to accommodate such losses.42 The risk of war losses was instead shifted 
to the governments waging them.43 
Courts have contemplated the impact of war on insurance recovery 
since at least the American Civil War.44 For example, in the 1871 case 
Welts v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,45 the New York Court of 
Appeals held that the death of a civilian railroad worker near a 
Confedera e mili ar  encampmen  did no  fall nder he defendan s ar 
exclusion clause.46 As the twentieth century saw two world wars, the 
number of insurance claims subject to the war exclusion significantly 
increased.47 These cases focused on physical losses that occurred during 
                                                     
37. 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
38. STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1. 
39. See Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. at 1464 65.  
40. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 1012.  
41. See id. a  1005 ( [F]or here o be a ar  a so ereign or quasi-sovereign must engage in 
hos ili ies. ); see also The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 666 (1863) 
( A ar ma  e is  here one of he belligeren s, claims so ereign righ s as agains  he o her. ). 
42. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1.  
43. See Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d a  994. In his specific case, Pan American had o rn 
to the United States government for war risk coverage for the excess over the London Market [insurer] 
limi .  Id. 
44. See Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).  
45. 48 N.Y. 34 (1871). 
46. Id. at 39 40. 
47. See, e.g., Britain S.S. Co. v. The King [1919] 1 K.B. 575 (holding war exclusion did not apply 
to a boat that ran aground due to war-mandated altered course); Queen Ins. Co. v. Globe & Rutgers 
Fire Ins. Co., 282 F. 976 (2d Cir. 1922) (holding that a ship s head-on collision with another ship due 
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periods of declared war between sovereign nations. For example, in 
Vanderbilt v. Travelers Insurance Co.,48 the war exclusion applied 
beca se he Lusitania was sunk in accordance with the instructions of a 
sovereign government, Germany, by naval forces of that government, 
during a period when a war was in progress between Great Britain and 
German . 49 Grounding decisions on the overt acts of sovereigns made 
the application of the war exclusion relatively straightforward. 
B. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co. and the Modern Interpretation of the War and Warlike 
Operations Exclusions 
Although the United States has not officially declared war since World 
War II,50 insurers have continued to use the war exclusion in an attempt 
to escape liability for certain losses. Modern decisions on the application 
of the war exclusion most often cite to Pan American World Airways, Inc. 
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (Pan Am).51 The case involved a Pan 
American World Airways (Pan Am) flight that was hijacked by two 
members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).52 
The hijackers seized control of the plane over London, forced the crew to 
fly to Beirut and Cairo, evacuated all of the passengers, and then destroyed 
the plane.53 Pan Am submitted a claim to Aetna to recover the loss from 
he aircraf s des r c ion, b  Ae na denied the claim, citing the war 
exclusion in Pan Am s all risk proper  polic .54 Specifically, Aetna relied 
on a usurped powers exclusion and an industry-standard war exclusion: 
C. This policy does not cover anything herein to the contrary 
notwithstanding loss or damage due to or resulting from: 
                                                     
to poor visibility as a result of a British order to sail without lights did not trigger the war exclusion); 
Vanderbilt v. Travelers  Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986 (App. Div. 
1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514 (1923) (holding that death in sinking of the Lusitania was excluded under 
war exclusion); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 340 U.S. 54 (1950) (holding a ship s collision with 
a minesweeper in 1942 did not qualify under the war exclusion).  
48. 184 N.Y.S. 54 (Sup. Ct. 1920), aff d, 194 N.Y.S. 986 (App. Div. 1922), aff d, 235 N.Y. 514 
(1923). 
49. Id. at 56. 
50. U.S. SENATE, OFFICIAL DECLARATIONS OF WAR BY CONGRESS, https://www.senate. 
gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/WarDeclarationsbyCongress.htm 
[https://perma.cc/S842-AHWR]. 
51. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re Sept. 11 
Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2014); Universal Cable 
Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019). 
52. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1974). 
53. See id. 
54. See id. at 994 96. 
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1. capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detention or the 
consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat, or any taking of 
the property insured or damage to or destruction thereof by any 
Government or governmental authority or agent (whether secret 
or otherwise) or by any military, naval or usurped power, whether 
any of the foregoing be done by way of requisition or otherwise 
and whether in time of peace or war and whether lawful or 
unlawful (this subdivision 1. shall not apply, however, to any such 
action by a foreign government or foreign governmental authority 
follow-the forceful diversion to a foreign country by any person 
not in lawful possession or custody of such insured aircraft and 
who is not an agent or representative, secret or otherwise, of any 
foreign government or governmental authority) [hereinafter 
clause 1 ]; 
2. war, invasion, civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or 
warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not 
[hereinafter clause 2 ];55 
Using this language, Aetna tried to escape liability and argued that Pan 
Am s ar ins rers sho ld co er he loss ins ead.56 If the attack was 
considered a warlike action, Pan Am would have sought coverage from 
he Uni ed S a es go ernmen  beca se American nder ri ers do no  
ri e ar risk co erage. 57 When interpreting the Aetna policy language, 
the court relied on the doctrine of contra proferentem.58 Contra 
proferentem provides that when there is ambiguity in an exclusionary term 
found in a policy of insurance, the term should be resolved in the favor of 
he ins red beca se of he ins rer s enhanced bargaining po er.59 
Because Aetna was aware of the threat of political plane hijackings at the 
time the policy was purchased, the Second Circuit reasoned that Aetna 
should have decided to use more precise exclusionary language in 
section C.1 of the policy to clarify the ambiguity in coverage.60 
The court hen disc ssed ha  q alified as ar  nder he polic , 
de ermining ha  ar is a co rse of hos ili  engaged in b  en i ies ha  
                                                     
55. Id. at 994 (emphasis added).  
56. See id. Pan Am had separate insurance coverage through Lloyd s underwriters that specifically 
covered the war risks that Aetna s policy excluded. See id. At the time, the London insurance market 
was the only insurance market in which aviators could obtain war risk coverage. See id. Pan Am then 
obtained excess war risk coverage through the United States government through the Federal Aviation 
Act of 1958. See id.; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1531 42 (1970).  
57. Pan Am. World Airways, 505 F.2d at 994. 
58. Id. at 999 1000. 
59. See id.  
60. See id. at 1000 01. 
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ha e a  leas  significan  a rib es of so ereign . 61 Aetna attempted to 
argue that a state of guerilla warfare existed between the United States 
and the PFLP.62 However, the court rejected the notion that the PFLP was 
a sovereign en i : [ ]he hijackers did no  ear insignia. The  did no  
openly carry arms. Their acts had criminal rather than military overtones. 
They were the agents of a radical political group, rather than a sovereign 
go ernmen . 63 
The court also rejected the notion that the damage caused by the PFLP 
agen s as a arlike opera ion. 64 The Second Circuit agreed with the 
dis ric  co r s holding ha  [ ]here is no arran  in he general 
understanding of English, in history, or in precedent for reading the phrase 
arlike opera ions  o encompass he inflic ion of in en ional iolence  
by political, non-governmental groups upon citizens of non-belligerent 
powers.65 The district court relied on a series of older British cases to 
demonstrate that warlike operations have never been understood to 
include violence by non-governmental entities in the common law 
tradition.66 For example, in Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v. Marten,67 the 
King s Bench held ha  he damage ca sed o a ship ha  rammed a 
submerged object upon the mistaken belief that it was a German 
s bmarine as a res l  of a arlike opera ion beca se he ship s cap ain 
attempted to act agains  he co n r s declared enemies.68 The Second 
Circuit also relied on the more recent case International Dairy 
Engineering Co. v. American Home Assurance Co.69 The International 
Dairy Co r  fo nd ha  he des r c ion of plain iff s bo  ma erials in So h 
Vietnam by American aerial parachute flares was the result of warlike 
opera ions beca se [ ]he loss as a  he si e of hos ili ies, i  as ca sed 
by a warlike agency, and the lost property was the property of a belligerent 
na ional. 70 Based on this interpretation, the Pan Am court found that 
here [ as] no basis ha soe er  for den ing co erage nder he arlike 
                                                     
61. Id. at 1012.  
62. See id. at 996.  
63. Id. at 1015.  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1015 16 (no ing ha  [ ]he dis ric  co r s holding is . . . supported by the weight of 
a hori  (citing Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp. 1098, 1130 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973))).  
66. See id. at 1016; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. King [1918] 1 K.B. 307; Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v. 
Marten [1918] 34 TLR 504, 505 (KB). 
67. [1918] 34 TLR 504 (KB). 
68. Id. at 505. 
69. 352 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff d, 474 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1973).  
70. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1017.  
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operation exclusion because the Pan Am airplane did not carry military 
cargo, was not destined for a theater of war, was not owned by a 
belligerent of war, and did not plan to fly over any theater of war.71 
C. The Impact of Pan Am and Subsequent Applications of the War 
Exclusion 
Subsequent to Pan Am, the Southern District of New York further 
analyzed what constitutes a sovereign in the context of the war exclusion 
when a hotel was damaged in Beirut, Lebanon.72 When Holiday Inn made 
a claim under its all risk property insurance policy for physical damage to 
the hotel resulting from skirmishes between religious groups in the city, 
Aetna denied liability.73 Aetna specifically cited the war exclusion in the 
polic , hich e cl ded losses ca sed as a res l  of [ ]ar, in asion, ac s 
of foreign enemy, hostilities or warlike operations (whether war be 
declared or not), civil war, mutiny, insurrection, revolution, conspiracy, 
mili ar  or s rped po er. 74 The court noted that while the press and 
politicians were calling the situation in Lebanon a civil war, the meaning 
of ar  hen sed in ins rance policies as q i e differen  from hose 
of politics or journalism. 75 
Instead, relying heavily on Pan Am and concl ding ha  ar  req ired 
conflict between two sovereigns, the court focused on determining 
whether the religious factions skirmishing in Beirut qualified as 
so ereigns  or q asi-so ereigns. 76 In order for a group to qualify as a 
sovereign or quasi-so ereign, i  m s  manifes  a rib es of so ereign ,  
which include staking out and maintaining adverse claims to territory and 
making declarations of independence and sovereignty.77 However, if the 
group is occ p ing erri or  i hin a so ereign s a e pon he consen  of 
ha  s a e s de j re go ernmen ,  hen ha  gro p canno  s fficien l  sho  
sovereignty.78 The court found that the religious groups at issue were not 
sovereigns because they occupied land with the consent of the de jure 
                                                     
71. Id. 
72. See Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
73. See id. at 1463. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. at 1464; see also Spinney s (1948) Ltd. v. Royal Ins. Co., [1980] 1 Lloyd s Rep. 406 (QBD). 
In that case, the British court held that the United Kingdom government s labelling of the unrest in 
Lebanon as a civil war the same unrest that caused the damage to the hotel in the Holiday Inn case
was irrelevant to the interpretation of war in the insurance context. Id. 
76. See Holiday Inns, 571 F. Supp. at 1500. 
77. Id. (emphasis omitted).  
78. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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government as understood in the insurance context.79 Although Syria 
participated in the conflict, the court viewed this as a sovereign fighting 
non-sovereign groups.80 In order for the war exclusion to apply, the 
insurer needed to show that the loss was caused by fighting between two 
sovereigns.81 
II. UNIVERSAL CABLE PRODUCTIONS AND DETERMINING 
WHETHER WAR EXISTS IS A POLITICAL OR JUDICIAL 
QUESTION 
Un il he Nin h Circ i s decision in Universal Cable Productions, LLC 
v. Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co.,82 the political question doctrine did 
not play an impactful role in war exclusion litigation. By invoking the 
political question doctrine, the Ninth Circuit revived a tool insurers could 
use to prevent war exclusion cases from being litigated.83 The Second 
Circuit had decided cases such as Pan Am with barely a cursory discussion 
of the political question doctrine, instead focusing on rigorous case 
analysis.84 This Par  firs  anal es he Nin h Circ i s applica ion of he 
political question doctrine in Universal Cable and its interpretation of the 
war exclusion. The second section of Part II briefly summarizes the 
history of the political question doctrine and its relationship with judicial 
interpretations of war in the United States. 
A. The Nin h Ci c i  Rein oca ion of he Poli ical Q e ion 
Doctrine in Universal Cable 
In Universal Cable, the plaintiff sent a film crew to shoot a television 
series in Jerusalem.85 Hamas shot rockets from Gaza into Israel, forcing 
the crew to stop filming and relocate.86 Universal tried to claim the cost 
of moving the film crew, but Atlantic Specialty denied the claim under 
the war exclusion.87 The Atlantic Specialty policy excluded losses caused 
by: (1) War, including undeclared or civil war; or (2) Warlike action by 
                                                     
79. See id. at 1501. 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. 929 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2019).  
83. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962) (holding that claim bringing political question is 
nonjusticiable if the claim cannot be judicially defined or remedied). 
84. See supra sections I.B, I.C.  
85. Universal Cable Prods., 929 F.3d at 1149.  
86. See id. at 1150. 
87. See id.  
 
Wan (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2020  12:09 PM 
1606 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1595 
 
a military force, including action in hindering or defending against an 
actual or expected attack, by any government, sovereign, or other 
authority using military personnel or other agents . . . . 88 The court held 
ha  [b]o h ar  and arlike ac ion b  a mili ar  force  ha e a 
speciali ed meaning in he ins rance con e 89 and ha  ar refers o and 
includes only hostilities carried on by entities that constitute governments 
a  leas  de fac o in charac er. 90 In contrast to Pan Am, the Universal Cable 
Court declined to apply the contra proferentem doctrine because the 
parties at issue were both sophisticated with relatively equal bargaining 
power.91 
Despite refusing to invoke contra proferentem, the court still did not 
apply the war exclusion to the loss at issue.92 Unlike Holiday Inns, the 
court here determined the sovereignty of Hamas not in an insurance 
context but based upon the political stance of the United States.93 The 
court relied on Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,94 hich held ha  [w]ho is 
the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a judicial, but is a 
political question, the determination of which by the legislative and 
executive departments of any government conclusively binds the 
judges . . . . 95 Beca se [ ]he Uni ed S a es has ne er recogni ed 
Palestine or Gaza as sovereign territorial nations, nor has it ever 
recognized Hamas as a sovereign or quasi-so ereign,  he co r  concl ded 
that Hamas was not an entity that could trigger the war exclusion.96 The 
co r  reasoned ha  beca se he Pales inian A hori  is he de j re 
government, and Hamas has recognized the Palestinian Authority as the 
con rolling go ernmen  of Pales ine,  Hamas co ld no  be a sovereign.97 
Although the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the war exclusion in this 
case, he co r s decision o res rrec  he poli ical q es ion doc rine in i s 
analysis has muddled future insurance litigation. 
                                                     
88. Id. at 1149. 
89. Id. at 1147. 
90. Id. at 1154. 
91. See id. at 1151. 
92. See id. at 1159 60.  
93. See id. at 1148.  
94. 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); see also Mingtai Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. UPS, 177 F.3d 1142, 
1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that even in the insurance context, sovereignty is a political, not a 
judicial question). 
95. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302. 
96. Universal Cable Prods., 929 F.3d at 1148. 
97. Id. at 1158. 
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B. A Brief History of the Political Question Doctrine and Its 
Relationship with War 
Politically-charged facts are not the same as nonjusticiable political 
questions.98 Courts use the political question doctrine to decline 
jurisdiction over an issue that has been delegated to another branch of 
government by the Constitution.99 The doctrine had not been invoked in 
war exclusion insurance litigation until Universal Cable, with courts 
preferring to analyze the specific facts of the case instead of only 
governmental decisions.100 The political question doctrine was first 
announced in the seminal case Marbury v. Madison,101 which determined 
ha  [q] es ions, in heir na re poli ical, or hich are, b  he cons i ion 
and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in his co r . 102 
The Supreme Court clarified when an issue is nonjusticiable under the 
political question doctrine in Baker v. Carr,103 listing six factors for courts 
to consider when deciding to apply the political question doctrine.104 
In eres ingl , [ ]he Co r s mos  comprehensi e effor  o define he 
parameters of political question doctrine came in [Baker,] a case far 
removed from matters of war or its duration, and in which the Court 
concluded that the dispute before it did not present a political ques ion. 105 
Historically, courts have declined to invoke the political question 
doctrine to determine the existence of war.106 Before Marbury was 
decided, the Court already demonstrated its willingness to determine the 
                                                     
98. See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Law at the End of War, 99 MINN. L. REV. 143, 164 (2014). 
99. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). 
100. See supra section II.A. 
101. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).  
102. Id. at 170. 
103. 369 U.S. 186.  
104. Id. a  217 ( Prominen  on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found 
[1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or 
[3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for 
nonjudicial discretion; or [4] he impossibili  of a co r s nder aking independen  resol ion i ho  
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for 
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment 
from m l ifario s prono ncemen s b  ario s depar men s on one q es ion. ). 
105. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 169.  
106. Id. a  157 ( Indeed, a number of contemporaneous statutes required similar inquiries into the 
beginning and/or ending date of the war, and while the Court sometimes addressed the matter with 
little or no analysis, in no case did it appear to contemplate declining jurisdiction over the issue as the 
poli ical q es ion doc rine o ld req ire. ). 
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existence of war for the purpose of statutory interpretation.107 In Bas v. 
Tingy,108 the Court was asked to consider a dispute arising under a 1799 
federal statute, which provided for certain rights to salvage for American 
ships that were retaken from an enemy.109 The question for the Court was 
whether the statute applied when a French merchant ship engaged with an 
American ship during a period in which war was not yet declared.110 The 
Court did not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction, reasoning that 
[i]n fact and in law we are at war: an American vessel fighting 
with a French vessel, to subdue and make her prize, is fighting 
with an enemy accurately and technically speaking: and if this be 
not sufficient evidence of the legislative mind, it is explained in 
the same law.111 
[E] en in he absence of a declaration of war by Congress, the Court 
would interpret the law based on the world as the justices themselves 
percei ed i ,  and did no  delega e his de ermina ion o he e ec i e 
branch.112 
Even with the formal creation of the political question doctrine in 
Marbury, courts continued to decide whether war existed for the purposes 
of statutory interpretation. For example, in Ludecke v. Watkins113 the 
Court interpreted the Alien Enemy Act114 nder he a hori  ha  hen 
the life of a statute is defined by the existence of a war, Congress leaves 
the determination of when a war is concluded to the usual political 
agencies of he Go ernmen . 115 The Court did not contradict its holding 
in Baker beca se here is a difference be een he posi ion . . . that the 
end of war depends, for purposes of the statute, on some kind of political 
act, and he ie , hich [ he Co r ] a oids, ha  ar s e is ence el non 
is a non-justiciable political question. 116 Later, the Court emphasized that 
nder he Cons i ion, one of he J diciar s charac eris ic roles is o 
interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibility merely because 
o r decision ma  ha e significan  poli ical o er ones. 117 
                                                     
107. See Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. 37 (1800).  
108. 4 U.S. 37 (1800).  
109. Id. at 37. 
110. Id. at 42. 
111. Id. 
112. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 151.  
113. 335 U.S. 160 (1948).  
114. 50 U.S.C. § 21.  
115. Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 169 n.13. 
116. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 164 (emphasis in original). 
117. Japan Whaling Ass n . Am. Ce acean Soc , 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986). 
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Like statutory claims, common law claims that involve politically-
charged facts are not the same as nonjusticiable political questions.118 In 
Alperin v. Vatican Bank,119 a group of Holocaust survivors and their 
descendants sued banks and political groups that profited from Nazi 
activities during World War II.120 The plaintiffs brought claims of 
conversion, unjust enrichment, and restitution (the Property Claims).121 
The court held that the Property Claims were justiciable.122 Simpl  
beca se a foreign bank is in ol ed and he case arises o  of a poli icall  
charged  con e  does no  ransform the Property Claims into political 
q es ions. 123 While war is a politically-charged topic, it is not completely 
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.124 Once a poli ical 
judgment is made to stop shooting, it must be within the power of the 
courts to determine under the objective standard given by law whatever 
the government subsequently says that hostilities have come to an 
end. 125 Cases that involve facts shaped by a political decision such as 
ending war are still justiciable if the issues can be measured by a legal 
standard. 
III. THE RISE OF STATE-SPONSORED CYBERATTACKS HAS 
MUDDLED THE LINE SEPARATING THE WAR EXCLUSION 
FROM THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE 
The inclusion of the political question doctrine in war exclusion 
insurance litigation has complicated the already complex factfinding that 
has evolved with the rise of state-sponsored cyberattacks.126 Cyberattacks 
do not involve the traditional markers of warfare courts have used to 
determine the applicability of the war exclusion in the past.127 
                                                     
118. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005). 
119. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).  
120. Id. at 533. 
121. Id. at 548. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. The plain iffs also claimed ha  he defendan s sed sla e labor d ring he ar ( he War 
Objec i es Claims ). Id. However, the court held that the War Objectives Claims were nonjusticiable 
under the political question doctrine because it did not want to speak for the U.S. government to 
condemn the actions of a foreign government. Id. at 561 62. By deciding to adjudicate the common 
law property claims and dismissing the war crimes claims, the Alperin Court preserved the separation 
of powers between the court and the executive branch as it avoided addressing matters of foreign 
relations and stuck to interpreting the law. Id. at 539. 
124. See Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 167. 
125. Id. at 218 19 (emphasis in original). 
126. See infra Part V. 
127. See supra Part I.  
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Governments have also been quick to blame others for cyberattacks using 
direct language that can lead the general public to believe the attacks to 
be acts of war.128 Part III first discusses cyberattacks generally and uses 
the WannaCry attacks as an example of recent ransomware cyber risks. 
The second section of Part III examines the NotPetya cyberattacks, 
specifically the lawsuit filed by Mondel z International as a result of its 
losses s ffered from he a acks and he Uni ed S a es  response. 
A. History of Cyberattacks and the Impact of the WannaCry 
Cyberattacks 
The threat of cyberattacks has been present since the propagation of the 
internet, but has only become a major corporate and national security 
threat in recent years.129 One of the most common types of malware used 
to initiate cyberattacks is ransomware.130 Ransomware is defined by the 
FBI as a pe of mal are ins alled on a comp er or ser er ha  encr p s 
he files, making hem inaccessible n il a specified ransom is paid. 131 
The Department of Justice es ima ed in 2017 ha  more han 4,000 
ransomware attacks have occurred daily since January 1, 2016 [which] is 
a 300% increase over the approximately 1,000 attacks per day seen in 
2015. 132 
One of the most notorious ransomware incursions prior to NotPetya 
was the WannaCry attacks in May 2017.133 A group of hackers used a 
s olen NSA ool kno n as ETERNALBLUE 134 to hack into Windows 
computers and render them unusable unless the user paid a bitcoin 
ransom.135 Microsoft issued a patch136 for this vulnerability, but many 
                                                     
128. See, e.g., Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5 (calling R ssian c bera ack he 
mos  des r c i e and cos l  c bera ack in his or ). 
129. Rosenstein, supra note 26. 
130. Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging 
Threat to Corporations, 86 TENN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2019).  
131. Public Service Announcement, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Alert No. I-091516-PSA: 
Ransomware Victims Urged to Report Infections to Federal Law Enforcement 1 (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160915.aspx [https://perma.cc/FP4D-6LW5]. 
132. Rosenstein, supra note 26.  
133. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 524 25. 
134. ETERNALBLUE  is a zero-day exploit, a software vulnerability for Microsoft Windows for 
which no patch or fix had been publicly released when it was initially stolen. See id. at 524. 
135. Id.; Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, BBC (May 13, 2017), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-39901382 [https://perma.cc/2JMF-97DD]. 
136. A patch is a software update usually comprised of code that is inserted or patched  into an 
existing program. It typically fixes a problem until the next version of the software is released. See 
Patch,  TECHOPEDIA  (Feb.  15,  2017),  https://www.techopedia.com/definition/24537/patch 
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older versions of Windows did not automatically install the patch.137 
Attacks such as WannaCry render computing hardware useless unless a 
ransom is paid.138 Companies that suffer such hardware, data, and time 
losses might turn to their insurers for recovery.139 As a result of the attack, 
more than 200,000 computers were infected in over 150 countries.140 The 
attack is estimated to have cost between $4 billion and $8 billion in 
damage worldwide.141 The United States attributed the attack to North 
Korea.142 Although the Trump administration imposed sanctions on North 
Korea, it did not call the attack an act of war.143 
B. The NotPetya Cyberattacks and the Response in the United States 
One month after the WannaCry attacks, the NotPetya cyberattacks 
struck across the globe.144 Like WannaCry, NotPetya was implemented 
hro gh he s olen ETERNALBLUE  NSA program.145 However, 
NotPetya was significantly more damaging than WannaCry.146 NotPetya 
was not technically ransomware because it irreversibly rendered affected 
hardware inoperable.147 Even if victims paid the bitcoin ransom, the files 
on the computers could not be recovered.148 Additionally, NotPetya could 
affect computers with the Microsoft patch that had protected many 
                                                     
[https://perma.cc/BJ78-N9DL]. 
137. See Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating Cyberattack in 
History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-
code-crashed-the-world/ [https://perma.cc/52ZU-DJK3] (no ing ha  Maersk s less-than-perfect 
sof are pa ching [and] o da ed opera ing s s ems  made he compan  lnerable agains  
NotPetya). 
138. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 507. 
139. Companies affected by the WannaCry attacks included the British National Health Service, 
Spanish telecom giant Telefonica, French car maker Renault, and United States shipping company 
FedEx. See Massive Ransomware Infection Hits Computers in 99 Countries, supra note 135. 
140. Russell Goldman, Wha  We Kno  and Don  Kno  Abo  he In e na ional C be a ack, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/12/world/europe/international-cyber 
attack-ransomware.html [https://perma.cc/TVW4-HSQ7]. 
141. Greenberg, supra note 137.  
142. Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing on the Attribution of the WannaCry Malware 




144. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1.  
145. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 532.  




Wan (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2020  12:09 PM 
1612 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1595 
 
machines from the WannaCry attacks in the previous month.149 Experts 
estimated that NotPetya caused over $10 billion in damage,150 hitting 
companies across the world, from Ukraine to the United States to 
Tasmania to Denmark.151 
The NotPetya cyberattacks have come to the forefront of insurance 
litigation as the world shifts from traditional land-warfare to 
cyberwarfare.152 Mondel z International, the company that owns food 
brands such as Cadbury chocolates and Ritz crackers, suffered an 
estimated $100 million in damages after the cyberattacks left their 
business operations floundering for weeks.153 Merck pharmaceuticals lost 
millions from the same attack.154 Both companies have sued their property 
insurers after their claims were denied under the war exclusion.155 These 
pending cases have broad implications on how the commercial insurance 
ind s r  ill opera e mo ing for ard, as go ernmen  officials, ho ha e 
increasingly taken a bolder approach to naming-and-shaming state 
sponsors of cyberattacks, . . . now risk becoming enmeshed in corporate 
disp es b  gi ing ins rance companies a ra ionale o den  claims. 156 
Mondel s case agains  Z rich foc ses on he ar e cl sion in 
Mondel s all risk proper  ins rance polic .157 The policy is generally 
supposed to cover physical losses caused by cyber events: 
The Policy provides annual coverage incepting November 1, 
2016, for all risks of ph sical loss or damage  o MDLZ s 
proper , specificall  incl ding ph sical loss or damage o 
electronic data, programs, or software, including physical loss or 
damage caused by the malicious introduction of a machine code 
or instruction . . . .  
. . . TIME ELEMENT  co erage, incl ding for Ac al Loss 
Sustained and EXTRA EXPENSE incurred by the Insured during 
the period of interruption directly resulting from the failure of the 
Ins red s elec ronic da a processing eq ipmen  or media o 
                                                     
149. Id. at 534. 
150. Greenberg, supra note 137.  
151. Id. 
152. Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 130, at 535 ( NotPetya represents a startling escalation of 
nation-s a e c ber ar. ); Greenberg, supra note 137 ( The release of No Pe a as an ac  of c ber ar 
by almost any definition . . . . ). 




157. Complaint at 4, Mondel z Int l, Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 2018-L-011008 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 2018), 2018 WL 4941760. 
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opera e  res l ing from malicio s c ber damage.158 
Ho e er, he polic  e cl des loss or damage res l ing from hos ile or 
warlike action in time of peace or ar  cond c ed b  an  (i) go ernmen  
or sovereign power (de jure or de facto); (ii) military, naval, or air force; 
or (iii) agen  or a hori  of an  par  specified in i or ii abo e. 159 
Before Mondel z filed its complaint against its insurer, the United 
States government publicly blamed the Russian military for the NotPetya 
cyberattacks.160 The Press Secretary released a statement, boldly claiming 
ha  he R ssian mili ar  la nched he mos  des r c i e and cos l  c ber-
attack in history . . . . [It] caus[ed] billions of dollars in damage across 
E rope, Asia, and he Americas. 161 The United States did not just blame 
the NotPetya attacks in the media. Authorized by the Countering 
America s Ad ersaries Thro gh Sanc ions Ac  (CAATSA),162 the 
President ordered the United States Treasury to impose economic 
sanctions on Russia as punishment for launching NotPetya.163 With the 
government publicly blaming a sovereign nation for cyberattacks against 
the country, insurers are poised to successfully invoke the war exclusion 
to avoid liability for these attacks. 
IV. TERRORISM AND CYBER INSURANCE ARE TOO NARROW 
TO COVER LOSSES ARISING FROM STATE-SPONSORED 
CYBERATTACKS 
Terrorism and cyberattacks are modern risks that now have specific 
insurance policies available for insureds. These new policies are highly 
specialized and come with various exclusions, leading many commercial 
insureds to attempt to secure coverage under their commercial all risk 
policies. With the rise of state-sponsored terrorism, insurers began 
                                                     
158. Id. at 2.  
159. Id. at 4. Pharmaceutical company Merck was another victim of the NotPetya attacks and filed 
a complaint against its insurers in New Jersey state court. See Complaint, Merck & Co., Inc. v. Ace 
Am. Ins. Co., No. UNN-L-002682-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Aug. 2, 2018). Merck is seeking 
co erage for ph sical loss or damage of an  comp er da a, coding, program, or sof are  as ell 
as business interruption. Id. at 8 9. Merck s ins rers allegedl  ha e also so gh  o a oid co erage 
under the war exclusion. Id. at 11. 
160. See Statement from the Press Secretary, supra note 5. 
161. Id. 
162. Countering America s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, Pub. L. No. 115-44, 131 Stat. 886 
(2017). While this law was passed just after the NotPetya attacks, it also provides provisions to enact 
sanctions against countries such as Iran and North Korea. Id. at 888 98, 940 55.  
163. Press Release, U.S. Dep t of the Treasury, Treasury Sanctions Russian Cyber Actors for 
Interference with the 2016 U.S. Elections and Malicious Cyber-Attacks (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm0312 [https://perma.cc/BN7Z-BXTY].  
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offering terrorism insurance coverage and writing exclusions specific to 
terrorism.164 The traditional war exclusion could not apply because 
terrorists do not officially act on the authority of a sovereign nation.165 
Part IV discusses the war exclusion as applied to terrorism insurance 
policies following the 9/11 attacks and the development of cyber 
insurance policies. Although the NotPetya attacks can be viewed as acts 
of cyberterrorism, an exploration of both terrorism and cyber insurance 
policies shows that these tools are not suited for recovering physical and 
time losses incurred from cyberattacks. 
A. Terrorism Insurance does not Cover State-Sponsored Acts 9/11 
Serves as a Rare Exception 
Until the 9/11 attacks occurred, courts consistently and confidently 
refused to apply the war exclusion to acts committed by terrorist groups.166 
Courts were comfortable determining that terrorist groups  
[did] not appear to have acquired de facto government status 
through their affiliation with government entities like the Taliban 
or the former regime in Iraq. Therefore, any loss resulting from 
terrorist acts by terrorist groups would not appear to be 
proximately caused by any war  waged by or between 
recognized states 
as traditionally recognized in insurance law.167 
American insurance jurisprudence loosened after the 9/11 attacks, 
although courts have been careful to draw narrow holdings.168 In light of 
the attacks, Congress passed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002,169 
which generally required insurers to offer terrorism insurance to 
commercial clients on the same terms as other types of insurance.170 These 
insurance policies covered losses caused by terrorism but not acts of 
war.171 
In subsequent 9/11 litigation, the owner of a building near the World 
                                                     
164. See PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:18. 
165. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) (stating that a terrorist is a criminal and not viewed as a 
soldier under federal law).  
166. See supra Part I.  
167. PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:21.  
168. See In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
169. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107 297, 116 Stat. 2322 (2002).  
170. Id. at 2327 28. 
171. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
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Trade Center sued the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey as the 
owner of the World Trade Center, under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 
(CERCLA)172 for recovery of clean up expenses.173 The insurers for the 
Por  A hori  claimed ha  he a ack fell nder he errorism polic s ar 
exclusion and denied payment.174 The co r  concl ded ha  he e ents of 
[9/11] were unique, and Congress, the President, and the American public 
rea ed 9/11 as niq e  compared o prior erroris  a acks.175 The court 
allowed the insurers to apply the war exclusion and deny payment.176 To 
bolster its decision, the court relied on he fac  ha  an ac  of error and 
de as a ion ha  pro okes he response of ar  can la er be charac eri ed 
as an act of war.177 Ho e er, he co r  emphasi ed ha  i s holding as o 
the act-of-war defense should be read narrowly, fitting the facts of this 
case onl . I  sho ld no  be a preceden  for cogna e la s of ins rance. 178 
Wi h he rise of s a e-sponsored errorism,  i  is becoming more diffic l  
to separate acts of war from acts of terrorism for the purpose of 
interpreting insurance exclusions.179 War losses tend to be catastrophic in 
scale and caused by sovereign military resources, which is why insurers 
try to exclude them.180 Terrorism insurance, on the other hand, is designed 
to cover unpredictable losses that are more akin to criminal, not military 
acts.181 Courts should continue to interpret terrorism insurance coverage 
narrowly and avoid making another exception like they did for 9/11. 
B. Cyber Insurance Is Inadequate to Cover Physical Losses from 
Cyber Events 
Cyber insurance policies are similar to terrorism insurance in that both 
are narrow in application and are not sufficient on their own to provide 
complete coverage for insureds in the event of a catastrophic loss.182 The 
                                                     
172. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601. 
173. In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d at 498. 
174. See id. at 498 99. 
175. Id. at 508.  
176. Id. at 514. 
177. Id. at 511. 
178. Id. at 514. 
179. Terrorism, BLACK S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining s a e-sponsored errorism  
as international terrorism sponsored by a sovereign government).  
180. PLITT ET AL., supra note 11, § 152:1. 
181. Id. § 152:21. 
182. See Hunt, supra note 30, at 448.  
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first cyber insurance policies were issued in the late 1990s, when 
computers became more commonly used in commercial settings.183 
Ho e er, mos  c ber policies ill no  co er ph sical damage o proper  
or eq ipmen  res l ing from a c ber e en . 184 Usually, the only first party 
coverage available under cyber insurance policies are for cos s 
associa ed i h los  elec ronic da a and sof are res ora ion. 185 Cyber 
ins rance policies, as he  are ri en no , are no  in ended o co er he 
frequent and manageable business risks that may result in economic loss, 
such as those associa ed i h ordinar  b siness opera ions. 186 The 
language of typical cyber insurance policies could preclude coverage for 
cyber events caused by foreign nations, or at the very least preclude 
coverage for the economic losses traditionally covered by time-element 
provisions.187 Instead, businesses continue to rely on traditional property 
insurance, rather than cyber insurance, to cover physical losses caused by 
cyber events. 
V. INSURERS SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO ESCAPE LIABILITY 
BY ASSERTING THE WAR EXCLUSION AND AVOID 
LITIGATION THROUGH THE POLITICAL QUESTION 
DOCTRINE 
The circuit split created by the Universal Cable Co r s applica ion of 
the political question doctrine should not deter courts from litigating war 
exclusion cases. A closer examination of the case law relied upon in 
Universal Cable reveals that war in the insurance context firmly remains 
a judicial, not a political, question. For this reason, the courts handling 
NotPetya war exclusion claims should not allow insurers to escape 
liability for the losses caused by the cyberattacks. Part V first analyzes 
Uni e al Cable  reliance on Oetjen and distinguishes interpreting 
treaties from insurance contracts. The second section of Part V applies the 
traditional war exclusion analysis established in Pan Am and concludes 
that insurers should remain liable for physical and time losses insured by 
all risk property insurance policies. 
                                                     
183. Id. at 404. 
184. Id. at 410. 
185. Id. at 411. 
186. Margaret A. Reetz et al., Cyber Risks: Evolving Threats, Emerging Coverages, and Ensuing 
Case Law, 122 PA. ST. L. REV. 727, 736 (2018).  
187. When a business s operations are interrupted by a covered peril, time loss  or ime-elemen  
coverage would apply to repay the insured s economic losses from the resultant inactivity. See Hunt, 
supra note 30, at 412.  
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A. Universal Cable  In oca ion of he Poli ical Q e ion Doc ine Is 
Misplaced 
Although there is a split between the Second and Ninth Circuits on 
whether the determination of sovereignty is a political question, the 
interpretation of an insurance contract is not a matter of international law 
and should remain a judicial issue.188 The Second Circuit in Pan Am and 
the Southern District of New York in Holiday Inns draw a stark division 
from he media and go ernmen s  poli ical recogni ion of so ereigns and 
the narrow definition of sovereign followed by the insurance industry.189 
Those courts were of the firm belief that insurance policies must be 
e amined in heir ins rance meaning  and that it was the role of the 
courts, not the media or the government, to make that determination.190 
More recently, however, the Ninth Circuit has leaned on the holding of 
Oetjen, and concluded ha  [ ]ho is he sovereign, de jure or de facto, of 
a territory is not a judicial, but a political question, the determination of 
which by the legislative and executive departments of any government 
concl si el  binds he j dges. 191 The Universal Cable Court concluded 
that determining the existence of war is a political question and only made 
its decision based on the actions of the government.192 
Going forward, courts should retain the power to determine if an entity 
is a sovereign for the purposes of insurance policy interpretation. While 
he Nin h Circ i s arg men  in Universal Cable may seem reasonable, it 
took the main source of law it relied upon out of context.193 The Court in 
Oetjen was primarily concerned with the interpretation of the Hague 
Convention and the validity of a purchase of real property from a Mexican 
general.194 Generally, the President, either through himself or the State 
Department, negotiates treaties and the Senate must give advice and 
consent before the United States may ratify the agreement.195 In this 
context, the Court logically would defer the determination of sovereignty 
to the legislative and executive branches, as they were responsible for the 
                                                     
188. See supra Part II.  
189. Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting that 
[i]n commercial li iga ion arising o  of ins rance policies, ords and phrases are cons r ed for 
ins rance p rposes a con e  q i e differen  from hose of poli ics or jo rnalism ). 
190. Id. at 1503. 
191. Universal Cable Prods., LLC v. Atl. Specialty Ins. Co., 929 F.3d 1143, 1158 59 (9th Cir. 
2019) (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918)). 
192. Id.  
193. Id.  
194. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299. 
195. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  
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ratification of the treaty. 
However, the same issues of foreign policy are not present in the 
negotiation or interpretation of an insurance contract. While courts may 
have to grapple with politically charged facts arising from an insurance 
policy, the legal issues are not political the decisions do not have the 
same effect as international law. The parties of an insurance contract are 
usually private entities, not nations. The interpretation of insurance 
contracts is more akin to the interpretation of statutes, which have always 
been i hin he j dicial branch s a hori .196 Just as the court retained the 
common law property claims in Alperin, the insurance claims are similar 
to common law insurance interpretation and should not be barred by the 
political question doctrine.197 While war is a political topic, its existence 
does not fall under the purview of the political q es ion doc rine: he 
e is ence of ar  depends on he legal con e  in hich i  arises, and ha  
context and meaning are generally susceptible to judicial 
iden ifica ion. 198 Therefore, the judicial determinations of sovereignty 
carried out in Pan Am and Holiday Inns are appropriate. 
B. In the Context of the NotPetya Attacks, Insurers Should not be able 
to Escape Liability Through the War or Warlike Actions Exclusion 
Assuming that the courts retain the right to determine who is and is not 
a sovereign within the meaning of an insurance policy, the NotPetya 
attacks should remain covered despite the presence of a war or warlike 
actions exclusion. Pursuant to Pan Am, war must be conducted between 
two sovereign powers.199 To be considered a warlike operation, the 
hostilities must be conducted in a theater of war and caused by a warlike 
agency.200 The NotPetya hackers are not sovereigns under the insurance 
definition of the term. The media and many governments around the world 
believe that the Russian military sponsored the attacks, but Russia has not 
publicly accepted responsibility.201 Even if the hackers were sovereigns 
within the insurance meaning, the attacks were not conducted against 
                                                     
196. See generally Pearlstein, supra note 98 (arguing that the courts are not barred by the political 
question doctrine to determine the existence of war for the purpose of statutory interpretation). See 
supra section I.D. 
197. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 548 (9th Cir. 2005). 
198. Pearlstein, supra note 98, at 167. 
199. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1012 (2d Cir. 1974). 
200. Henry & MacGregor (Ltd.) v. Marten [1918] 34 TLR 504, 505 (KB); Pan Am. World Airways, 
Inc., 505 F.2d at 1017. 
201. Greenberg, supra note 141. 
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another sovereign, but instead targeted companies across the world.202 
Therefore, the parties to the attacks would still fail to meet the definition 
of war within the meaning of the insurance policies at issue. 
In addition to Mondel z International, Danish shipping conglomerate 
Maersk, American pharmaceutical company Merck, and Ukranian 
software company Linkos Group were also victims of the cyberattack.203 
The insurers could try to argue that the companies were victims of warlike 
operations, but it would be a stretch to call every affected company a 
theater of war or a sufficient proxy for the sovereigns Russia allegedly 
attacked.204 Complica ing he ins rer s arg men  is he fac  ha  R ssia s 
state-owned oil company Rosneft was also a victim of the cyberattacks.205 
The insurers would be hard-pressed to argue that Russia, through the 
NotPetya hackers, was attacking itself or was collateral in a warlike 
operation. 
Cyberwarfare is much like terrorism in that it often has no regard for 
national borders. The law rigid and slow to evolve struggled to adopt 
legal remedies, especially for terrorism.206 Following this trend, the courts 
determining the coverage claims for Mondel z and others will likely 
refuse to recognize a new interpretation of the war exclusion to allow the 
insurers to avoid liability. Just as the Pan Am Court noted that Aetna was 
aware of the risk of political plane hijackings and failed to explicitly 
exclude such losses in its all risk policy,207 the NotPetya insurers should 
reasonably have been aware of the risk of cyberattacks in the wake of 
WannaCry and explicitly excluded such losses if they wished to avoid 
liability.208 
Regardless of the decision reached in the Mondel z and Merck suits, 
insurers will be sure to adapt their practices in the future. The party that 
will bear the burden of cyber losses may well be different in the coming 
years. In a traditional war between nations, it is the governments, rather 
than private insurers, that bear the burden of such losses.209 As the 
landscape of modern warfare changes, the government may shoulder the 
                                                     
202. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1. 
203. Id.; Greenberg, supra note 141. 
204. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1012. 
205. Satariano & Perlroth, supra note 1. 
206. See generally In re Sept. 11 Litig., 931 F. Supp. 2d 496 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff d, 751 F.3d 86 
(2d Cir. 2014). 
207. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 1000. 
208. See supra section III.B.  
209. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 505 F.2d at 994 (noting at the time of he case ha  American 
underwriters do not write war risk coverage. Thus, Pan American had to turn to the United States 
government for war risk coverage for he e cess o er he London marke  limi ).  
Wan (Do Not Delete) 10/4/2020  12:09 PM 
1620 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:1595 
 
burden for cyber losses as well. Until then, private insurers should more 
clearly exclude all types of losses proximately caused by cyberattacks to 
avoid liability. Large companies should also consider additional strategies 
to protect their business interests from cyberattacks. Soon, they may not 
be able to rely on insurers. 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial all risk property insurance policies are commonly held by 
companies o pro ec  losses o he ins red s proper . These policies 
typically include a war exclusion, which specifically does not cover losses 
arising from war or warlike actions. In the insurance industry, war must 
be a conflict between two sovereign nations. While courts have not 
hesitated to apply the war exclusion in periods of declared war, the 
exclusion has become more ambiguous with the rise of terrorism and 
cyberattacks. The determination of sovereignty and subsequently the 
existence of war for purposes of the insurance policy can invoke 
separation of power concerns. While the Second Circuit has historically 
declined to apply the political question doctrine to its war exclusion 
analysis, the Ninth Circuit has recently brought the political question 
doctrine back to the forefront of its war exclusion jurisprudence. 
Insurers should not be able to use the war exclusion for cyberterror 
events. Going forward, they should adapt the terms of their policy 
exclusions to better account for cyber-related losses across all types of 
insurance policies. With the current wording of war exclusion provisions, 
cyberattacks such as NotPetya would be considered closer to acts of 
terrorism than acts of war because the conflicts are not between 
sovereigns. Courts will not allow private insurers to shirk liability when 
precedent urges the narrow application of the war exclusion. Although the 
United States government and the media have been holding foreign 
nations responsible for the cyberattacks, the response so far has not been 
warlike when compared to the 9/11 attacks. Because the NotPetya attacks 
are not warlike in the insurance sense, it is the responsibility of insurers 
to specifically exclude physical and time losses related to cyberattacks in 
order to ensure that they do not bear such liability in the future. 
Governments provide insurance for losses caused by physical warfare
they should assume the risk for cyberwarfare as well. Modern warfare has 
evolved since the war exclusion was first enacted in the eighteenth 
century. The terms of the war exclusion must evolve too. 
 
 
